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Stream Verification
Justin Thaler∗
Abstract
We survey models and algorithms for stream verification.
1 Problem Definition
Stream verification is concerned with the following setting. A computationally limited client wants to com-
pute some property of a massive input, but lacks the resources to store even a small fraction of the input,
and hence cannot perform the desired computation locally. The client therefore accesses a powerful but un-
trusted service provider (e.g., a commercial cloud computing service), who not only performs the requested
computation, but also proves that the answer is correct. An array of closely related models have been in-
troduced to capture this scenario. The following section provides a unified presentation of these models,
emphasizing their common features before delineating their differences.
Stream Verification Model. Let σ = 〈a1, a2, . . . , am〉 be a data stream, where each ai comes from a data
universe U of size n, and let F be a function mapping data streams to a finite range R. A stream verification
protocol for F involves two parties: a prover P, and a (randomized) verifier V . The protocol consists of two
stages: a stream observation stage and a proof verification stage.
In the stream observation stage, V processes the stream σ, subject to the standard constraints of the
data-stream model, i.e., sequential access to σ and limited memory. In the proof verification stage, V and P
exchange a sequence of one or more messages, and afterward V outputs a value b. V is allowed to output a
special symbol ⊥ indicating a rejection of P’s claims. Formally, V constitutes a stream verification protocol
if the following two properties are satisfied.
• Completeness: There is some prover strategy P such that, for all streams σ, the probability that V
outputs F (σ) after interacting with P is at least 2/3.
• Soundness: For all streams σ and all prover strategies P, the probability that V outputs a value not in
{F (x),⊥} after interacting with P is at most ǫ ≤ 1/3.
Here, the probabilities are taken over V’s internal randomness. The constants 2/3 and 1/3 are not
essential and are chosen by convention. The parameter ǫ is referred to as the soundness error of the protocol.
Costs. There are five primary costs in any stream verification protocol: (1) V’s space usage, (2) the total
communication cost, (3) V’s runtime, (4) P’s runtime, and (5) the number of messages exchanged.
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Differences Between Models. There are three primary differences between the various models of stream
verification that have been put forth in the literature. The first is whether the soundness condition is re-
quired to hold against all cheating provers (such protocols are called information-theoretically or statistically
sound), or only against cheating provers that run in polynomial time (such protocols are called computation-
ally sound). The second is the amount and format of the interaction allowed between P and V . The third
is the temporal relationship between the stream observation and proof verification stage — in particular,
several models permit P and V to exchange messages before and during the stream observation stage, and
sometimes permit the prover’s messages to depend on parts of the data stream that V has not yet seen. In
general, more permissive models allow a larger class of problems to be solved efficiently, but may yield
protocols that are less realistic.
Summary of Models. The annotated data streaming (ADS) model, introduced by Chakrabarti et al. [3], is
non-interactive: P is permitted to send a single message to V , with no communication allowed in the reverse
direction. Technically, this model permits the contents of P’s message to be interleaved with the stream, in
which case each bit of P’s message may be viewed as an “annotation” associated with a particular stream
update. However, for most ADS protocols that have developed, P’s message does not need to be interleaved
with the stream. Chakrabarti et al. [3] distinguish between two kinds of ADS protocols: prescient protocols,
in which the annotation sent at any given time can depend on parts of the data stream that V has not yet seen,
and online protocols, which disallow this kind of dependence.
Streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) extend the ADS model to allow the prover and verifier to exchange
many messages. This model was introduced by Cormode et al. [8].
The Arthur-Merlin streaming model was introduced by Gur and Raz [12]: this model is equivalent to
a restricted class of SIPs, in which V is only allowed to send a single message to P (which must consist
entirely of random coin tosses, in analogy with the classical complexity class AM), before receiving P’s
reply.
The model of streaming delegation was introduced by Chung et al. [5], and corresponds to SIPs that
only satisfy computational, rather than information-theoretic, soundness.
2 Key Results
Obtaining exact answers even for basic problems in the standard data streaming model is impossible using
o(n) space. In contrast, stream verification protocols with o(n) space and communication costs have been
developed for (exactly solving) a wide variety of problems. Many of these protocols have adapted powerful
algebraic techniques originally developed in the classical literature on interactive proofs, particularly the
sum-check protocol of Lund et al. [17]. All of the protocols described in Sections 2.1-2.3 apply even to
streams in the strict turnstile update model, where universe items can be deleted as well as inserted. The
protocols in Section 2.4 do not support deletions. Unless stated otherwise, all protocols described in this
survey are online, i.e., the honest prover’s message at any given time does not depend on parts of the data
stream that V has not yet seen.
2.1 Annotated Data Streams
Chakrabarti et al. [3] showed that prescient ADS protocols can be exponentially more powerful than on-
line ones for some problems. For example, there is a prescient ADS protocol with logarithmic space and
communication costs for computing the median of a sequence of numbers: P sends V the claimed median
τ at the start of the stream, and while observing the stream, V checks that |{j : aj < τ}| ≤ m/2, and
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|{j : aj > τ}| ≤ m/2, which can be done using an O(logm)-bit counter. Meanwhile, Chakrabarti et
al. [3] proved that any online protocol for MEDIAN with communication cost h and space cost v requires
h · v = Ω(n), and gave an online ADS protocol achieving these communication–space tradeoffs up to
logarithmic factors.
Chakrabarti et al. [3] also gave online ADS protocols achieving identical tradeoffs between space and
communication costs for problems including FREQUENCY MOMENTS and FREQUENT ITEMS, and used a
lower bound due to Klauck [13] on the Merlin-Arthur communication complexity of the SET-DISJOINTNESS
function to show that these tradeoffs are optimal for these problems, even among prescient protocols. Sub-
sequent work [7, 23] gave similarly optimal online ADS protocols for several more problems, including
maximum matching and counting triangles in graphs, and matrix-vector multiplication. Chakrabarti et al.
[2] gave optimized protocols for streams whose length m is much smaller than the universe size n.
2.2 Streaming Interactive Proofs
Cormode et al. [8] showed that several general protocols from the classical literature on interactive proofs
can be simulated in the SIP model. In particular, this includes a powerful, general-purpose protocol due to
Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [10] (henceforth, the GKR protocol). Given any problem computed by
an arithmetic or Boolean circuit of polynomial size and polylogarithmic depth, the GKR protocol requires
only polylogarithmic space and communication while using polylogarithmic rounds of verifier–prover in-
teraction. This yields SIPs for exactly solving many basic streaming problems with polylogarithmic space
and communication costs, including FREQUENCY MOMENTS, FREQUENT ITEMS, and GRAPH CONNEC-
TIVITY. Cormode et al. [8] also gave optimized protocols for specific problems, including FREQUENCY
MOMENTS (see the Detailed Example below).
Gur and Raz [12] gave an Arthur-Merlin streaming protocol for the DISTINCT ELEMENTS problem
with communication cost O˜(h) space cost O˜(v) for any h, v satisfying h · v ≥ n, where the O˜ notation
hides factors that are polylogarithmic in n. Klauck and Prakash [15] extended this protocol to give an SIP
for DISTINCT ELEMENTS with polylogarithmic space and communication costs and logarithmically many
rounds of prover–verifier interaction.
Chakrabarti et al. [4] gave constant-round online SIPs with logarithmic space and communication costs
for many problems, including INDEX, RANGE-COUNTING, and NEAREST-NEIGHBOR SEARCH. These
protocols are exponentially more efficient than what can be achieved by constant-round online SIPs in which
V’s messages to the prover are independent of the input (such as is required in the Arthur-Merlin streaming
model of [12]). For classical interactive proofs where the verifier is not restricted to be streaming, allowing
V’s messages to depend on the input does not yield analogous efficiency improvements: Goldwasser and
Sipser [11] showed that any interactive proof can be simulated with a polynomial blowup in all costs by an
interactive proof in which V’s messages to P consist entirely of random coin tosses.
2.3 Computationally Sound Protocols
Computationally sound protocols may achieve properties that are unattainable in the information-theoretic
setting. For example, they typically achieve reusability, allowing the verifier to use the same randomness
to answer many queries. In contrast, most SIPs only support “one-shot” queries, because they require the
verifier to reveal secret randomness to the prover over the course of the protocol.
Chung et al. [5] combined the GKR protocol with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to give reusable
two-message streaming delegation protocols with polylogarithmic space and communication costs for any
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problem in the complexity class NC. They also gave reusable four-message protocols with polylogarithimic
space and communication costs for any problem in the complexity class P.
Papamanthou et al. [18] gave improved streaming delegation protocols for a class of low-complexity
queries including point queries and range search: these protocols avoid the use of FHE, and allow the prover
to answer such queries in polylogarithmic time. (In contrast, protocols based on the GKR protocol [5, 8]
require the prover to spend time quasilinear in the size of the data stream after receiving a query, even if the
answer itself can be computed in sublinear time.) The protocols of [18] are based on hash trees.
2.4 Models Allowing Linear Total Communication
The literature on stream verification contains two models that depart from those described above in that they
allow P and V to communicate on each stream update. In particular, they allow a linear amount of total
communication, but aim to bound the maximum amount of communication exchanged (and processing time
spent) during any stream update.
A Statistically Sound Model. Klauck and Prakash [14] studied a variant of online SIPs, in which P and
V are allowed to exchange a constant number of messages during each stream update, as long as at most a
constant number of machine words are exchanged during each update. They gave protocols in this model for
MEDIAN, for determining if a matrix is full-rank, and for approximating the longest-increasing subsequence
of the stream.
A Computationally Sound Model. Schro¨der and Schro¨der [20] introduced a model requiring only compu-
tational soundness, which they called the verifiable data streaming (VDS) model. This model is targeted at
settings in which there are many parties who may wish to verify answers returned by the prover. In the VDS
model, V is allowed to send a short message to P on each stream update, with no communication allowed
in the reverse direction. VDS protocols are required to be reusable and publicly verifiable, in the sense that
any party who knows V’s public key can verify any response by the prover. The VDS model does not permit
V to update the public key on every stream update, as this would require coordination between all parties
wishing to verify information returned by the prover.
There is a trivial VDS protocol for the INDEX problem, requiring polylogarithmic communication on
each stream update. Recall that in the INDEX problem, the data stream specifies all entries of a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n
, followed by an index i ∈ [n], and the goal to output xi. In the trivial VDS
protocol, for every stream update xj , V sends to P a digital signature of the tuple (j, xj). After the stream
observation phase, P sends to V the claimed value of xi along with a valid digital signature of the tuple
(i, xi). The protocol is secure assuming the prover cannot forge valid signatures: under this assumption,
the only way P can efficiently produce a valid signature of the tuple (i, xi) is if V had previously sent the
signature to P.
Schro¨der and Schro¨der [20] gave a VDS protocol that supports INDEX queries in a more general setting
in which the stream not only contains entries of the vector x, but also contains UPDATE operations. Here,
an UPDATE operation changes the value of a designated entry xj of x to a new value x′j . However, in the
protocol of [20], each UPDATE operation requires bidirectional communication (one message from P to V ,
followed by one from V to P), as well as an update to V’s public key.
Krupp et al. [16] gave related VDS protocols that reduces costs by logarithmic factors.
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Input: V is given oracle access to a v-variate polynomial g over finite field F and an H ∈ F.
Goal: Determine whether H =
∑
(x1,...,xv)∈{0,1}v
g(x1, . . . , xv).
• In the first round, P computes the univariate polynomial
g1(X1) :=
∑
x2,...,xv∈{0,1}v−1
g(X1, x2, . . . , xv),
and sends g1 to V . V checks that g1 is a univariate polynomial of degree at most deg1(g), and that
H = g1(0) + g1(1), rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element r1 ∈ F, and sends r1 to P .
• In the jth round, for 1 < j < v, P sends to V the univariate polynomial
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xv)∈{0,1}v−j
g(r1, . . . , rj−1, Xj , xj+1, . . . , xv).
V checks that gj is a univariate polynomial of degree at most degj(g), and that gj−1(rj−1) =
gj(0) + gj(1), rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element rj ∈ F, and sends rj to P .
• In round v, P sends to V the univariate polynomial
gv(Xv) = g(r1, . . . , rv−1, Xv).
V checks that gv is a univariate polynomial of degree at most degv(g), rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element rv ∈ F and evaluates g(r1, . . . , rv) with a single oracle query to g. V
checks that gv(rv) = g(r1, . . . , rv), rejecting if not.
• If V has not yet rejected, V halts and accepts.
Figure 1: Description of the sum-check protocol. degi(g) denotes the degree of g in the ith variable.
2.5 Implementations
Implementations of the GKR protocol were provided by Cormode et al. in [6] and Thaler in [22]. Cormode
et al. [6] also provided optimized implementations of several ADS protocols from [3, 7]. Thaler et al. [24]
provided parallelized implementations using Graphics Processing Units.
Qian [19] refined and implemented the streaming delegation protocol for point queries and range search
of Papamanthou et al. [18].
Implementations of VDS protocols are described by Schro¨der and Simkin [21] and Krupp et al. [16].
3 Detailed Example
As described in [8], the sum-check protocol can be directly applied to give an SIP for the kth frequency
moment problem with log n rounds of prover–verifier iteration, and O(log2(n)) space and communication
costs. The sum-check protocol is described in Figure 1.
Properties and Costs of the Sum-check Protocol. The sum-check protocol satisfies perfect completeness,
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and has soundness error ǫ ≤ v · deg(g)/|F|, where deg(g) := maxvi=1 degi(g) denotes maximum degree of
g in any variable (see [17] for a proof). There is one round of prover–verifier interaction in the sum-check
protocol for each of the v variables of g, and the total communication O(v · deg(g)) field elements.
Note that as described in Figure 1, the sum-check protocol assumes that the verifier has oracle access to
g. However, this will not be the case in applications, as g will ultimately be a polynomial that depends on
the input data stream.
The SIP for Frequency Moments. In the kth frequency moments problem, the goal is to output
∑
i∈U f
k
i ,
where fi is the number of times item i appears in the data stream σ. For a vector i = (i1, . . . , ilog n) ∈
{0, 1}log n, let χi(x1, . . . , xlogn) =
∏logn
k=1 χik(xk), where χ0(xk) = 1 − xk and χ1(xk) = xk. χi is the
unique multilinear polynomial that maps i ∈ {0, 1}log n to 1 and all other values in {0, 1}log n to 0, and it is
referred to as the multilinear extension of i.
For each i ∈ U , associate i with a vector i ∈ {0, 1}log n in the natural way, and let F be a finite field with
nk ≤ |F| ≤ 4 · nk. Define the polynomial fˆ : Flogn → F via
fˆ =
∑
i∈{0,1}log n
fi · χi. (1)
Note that fˆ is the unique multilinear polynomial satisfying the property that fˆ(i) = fi for all i ∈ {0, 1}log n.
The kth frequency moment of σ is equal to
∑
i∈{0,1}log n f
k
i =
∑
i∈{0,1}log n(fˆ
k)(i). Hence, in order
to compute the kth frequency moment of σ, it suffices to apply the sum-check protocol to the polynomial
g = fˆk. This requires log n rounds of prover–verifier interaction, and since the total degree of fˆk is k · log n,
the total communication cost is O(k log n) field elements. which require O(k2 log2 n) total bits to specify.
At the end of the sum-check protocol, V must compute g(r1, . . . , rlogn) = (fˆk)(r1, . . . , rlogn) for
randomly chosen (r1, . . . , rlogn) ∈ Flogn. It suffices for V to evaluate z := fˆ(r1, . . . , rlogn), since
(fˆk)(r1, . . . , rlogn) = z
k
. The following lemma establishes that V can evaluate z with a single pass over σ,
while storing O(log n) field elements.
Lemma 1. V can compute z = fˆ(r1, . . . , rlog n) with a single streaming pass over σ, while storing O(log n)
field elements.
Proof. Given any stream update aj ∈ U , let aj ∈ {0, 1}log n denote the binary vector associated with
aj . It follows from Equation (1) that fˆ(r1, . . . , rlogn) =
∑m
j=1 χaj(r1, . . . , rlogn). Thus, V can compute
fˆ(r1, . . . , rlogn) incrementally from the raw stream by initializing fˆ(r1, . . . , rlogn) ← 0, and processing
each update aj via:
fˆ(r1, . . . , rlog n)← fˆ(r1, . . . , rlogn) + χaj(r1, . . . , rlog n).
V only needs to store (r1, . . . , rlog n) and fˆ(r1, . . . , rlog n), which is O(log n) field elements in total.
4 Open Problems
• Two-message online SIP protocols with logarithmic space and communication costs are known for
several functions, including the INDEX function (cf. [4]). It is also known that existing techniques
cannot yield 2- or 3-message online SIPs of polylogarithmic cost for the MEDIAN or FREQUENCY
MOMENTS problems. However, the following is open: exhibit an explicit function F : {0, 1}n →
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{0, 1} that cannot be computed by any online two-message SIP with communication and space costs
both bounded above by h, for some h = ω(log n). See [4] for details. Candidate functions satisfying
this property include SET-DISJOINTNESS and INNER-PRODUCT-MOD-2.
• For several functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, it is known that any online ADS protocol for F with
communication cost h and space cost v requires h · v = Ω(n). This lower bound is tight in many
cases, such as for the INDEX function (cf. [3]). However, the following is open: exhibit an explicit
function that cannot be computed by any online ADS protocol with communication and space costs
both bounded above by h, for some h = ω(n1/2).
• Chakrabarti et al. [2] and Thaler [23] have also identified explicit problems which are just as hard for
online ADS protocols as they are in the standard data streaming model, in the sense that the sum of
V’s space cost and the communication cost in any online ADS protocol must be at least as large as
the space complexity of a standard streaming algorithm for the problem, up to constant or logarithmic
factors. However, it is open to exhibit an explicit function F that is just as hard in for prescient ADS
protocols as it is in the standard streaming model.
Formally, the following is open: exhibit an explicit function F such that, for any constant δ > 0, F
cannot be computed by any prescient ADS protocol with communication and space cost both bounded
above by O(stream(F )1−δ). Here, stream(F ) denotes the minimum space complexity of any stream-
ing algorithm that, for any input stream σ, outputs F (σ) with probability at least 2/3. Candidate
functions include GRAPH CONNECTIVITY and GRAPH BIPARTITENESS.
For all three problems, functions satisfying the relevant properties are known to exist by counting argu-
ments. But as stated above, identifying explicit functions satisfying the properties remains open.
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